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Abstract 
Both within clinical and wider societal discourses, the term ‘schizophrenia’ has 
achieved considerable potency as a signifier, privileging particular conceptual frames 
for understanding and responding to mental distress. However, its status has been 
subject to instability, as it has lacked indisputable biological correlates that would 
anchor its place within the canon of medical diagnosis.  Informed by a semiotic 
perspective, this paper focuses on its recent history: how ‘schizophrenia has been 
claimed, appropriated and contested – and how this connects with its earlier history 
of signification.  It also explores how the dominance of this signifier has influenced 
the ways in which people with the diagnosis may find themselves constructed in their 
interactions with professionals, family and wider society, and hence how they may 
come to see themselves. 
It is argued that, from a point in the 1990s when ‘schizophrenia’ had achieved an 
almost iconic status, the term is now subject to greater instability, with concerns and 
challenges being raised from both within and outside psychiatry.  On the one hand, 
this uncertainty has triggered a ‘calls to arms’ from those within the psychiatric 
establishment who see diagnoses such as ‘schizophrenia’ as crucial to their 
professional identity and status.  On the other, this has created spaces for new 
conversations and alliances between elements within neurology, psychiatry, social 
work and other professions, and between these and service users.  Some of these 
conversations are casting doubt upon the validity and utility of ‘schizophrenia’ as a 
construct, and are beginning to posit alternative regimes of signification. 
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A crisis of meaning:  can ‘schizophrenia’ survive in the twenty first century?  
  
 
‘Does a 19th century expression referring to a state of ‘split mind’ represent a suitable 
term … in the 21st century?’ Jim van Os (2010)  
 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, medicine provided a dominant framework 
for speaking about mental health difficulties.  Within the language of diagnosis, the 
term ‘schizophrenia’ played a pivotal role, not just as a descriptor of certain types of 
experience, but as an anchor for signifying particular ways of viewing mental 
distress.  In turn, it became a powerful signifier in how mental distress was 
conceived within everyday discourse – impacting profoundly upon those whose 
experience it sought to describe and define.  It was also appropriated within 
postmodern theory as a signifier that opens up the fragility of personal subjectivity 
more generally.[1]  However, it has proved to be ‘a highly unstable sign’,[2] with its 
meaning and usage shifting over time and questions being raised as to its utility and 
validity.[3]  Building on previous historical work,[4,5] and on semiotic studies,[1,2] 
this paper examines the recent history and current status of the signifier - in relation 
to its historical antecedents, prevailing discourses and more recent debates and 
discursive shifts.   
 
Signifiers and signified 
A valuable insight from the deconstruction of language undertaken by the French 
semiologist Barthes is that linguistic terms, or signifiers, are not simply a neutral 
reflection of some self-evident reality.  Instead, although it may appear that their 
meaning is anchored by their relationship to some phenomenal entity, their power to 
signify may actually derive from their positioning relative to other signifiers within a 
wider chain of signification. This chain may operate so as to ‘divide reality’ in a 
certain way and thereby impose a particular order onto what is signified and 
‘naturalise’ this as a culturally embedded and taken-for-granted way of making sense 
of the phenomenal world.[6]     Using this perspective, the psychiatric practice of 
differential diagnosis may be seen to provide a chain of signifiers that ‘divide up’ a 
panoply of unusual and distressing mental experiences, so as to ‘create a concrete, 
cohering entity’, imposing an order where, arguably, none exists’.[2]  While what is 
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signified by ‘schizophrenia’ may be hard to pin down in isolation, a greater degree of 
certainty is claimed once it is determined that related signifiers in the signifying 
chain, such as ‘dementia’ or ‘bipolar disorder’, can each be ruled out.   
Derrida argued that the meaning (and legitimation) of a signifier could be constructed 
through the operation of ‘différance’ – both how it differed from other related 
signifiers within its discursive context, and how it deferred to a history of pre-existing 
meanings.[7]  For example, the current meaning of ‘British’ may be constructed 
through its relationships of difference vis-à-vis other related signifiers, such as 
‘European’, ‘Scottish’ or ‘English’, and it may also defer to past constructions of 
‘Britishness’, perhaps linked to tropes from the Second World War or the loss of 
empire.  Similarly the current meaning of a diagnostic signifier such as 
‘schizophrenia’ may derive, not just from its difference from other diagnostic 
signifiers, but also from its deferral to past significations of ‘schizophrenia’ or related 
concepts. 
Whilst within much of medicine, diagnostic signifiers can be relatively stable, and 
anchored to distinctive physiological processes, signifiers of mental distress can be 
inherently more slippery since, despite a considerable research effort, it is still 
acknowledged that ‘very few psychiatric disorders have a biological basis’.[8]  In 
particular, the linkage of the signifier ‘schizophrenia’ to anything fixed within 
phenomenal reality has seemed somewhat fragile and open to controversy and 
contestation.[3;9-10]  The term does not reliably connect to any straightforward 
underlying pathology, and it has proved hard to define an exclusive set of symptoms 
and a trajectory over time which people with the diagnosis would have in common, 
and which would clearly differentiate them from others with a different diagnosis or 
none at all.[11]    
Not only do diagnoses denote (i.e. describe and categorise) particular constellations 
of experience and behavior; but they can take on further connotations within wider 
cultural (and professional) contexts.  Within the immediate field of mental healthcare, 
a diagnosis may bring forth specific connotations, such as particular ideas of 
causation, the meaningfulness or otherwise of current experience, and the possible 
future ahead. It may also connote a particular status for the professional group which 
has responsibility for determining diagnosis.  Once a signifier such as ‘schizophrenia’ 
is established, ‘society can very well refunctionalise it’,[12] thereby accruing a range 
of other connotations,[1,2] including ones which serve to stigmatise and construct 
people as ‘other’, or to justify policies of segregation or compulsory treatment. 
As Sontag observes, any disease (mental or physical) ‘whose causality is murky … 
tends to be awash with significance’.[13]  For people experiencing mental distress, 
diagnostic signifiers can have a powerful influence both on self-identity and on how 
they  become constructed in their relationships with those around them.  Through 
such processes, the signifier ‘schizophrenia’, and the meanings and practices 
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associated with it, may come to influence aspects of the very symptomatology it 
claims to describe (such as apathy or the blunting of emotional expression).   
On the positive side, the term ‘schizophrenia’ can operate as a social permission to 
be distressed and to be relieved of excessive responsibility – and many people 
describe a sense of relief when they receive a formal diagnosis.  It can provide ‘a 
means for people to externalise their problems rather than feeling that they [are] 
personally responsible for them’.[14]  Craddock and Mynors-Wallis suggest that, not 
only may it provide reassurance ‘that their situation is not unique’, but also, perhaps 
more controversially, that their experience is no longer ‘mysterious or 
inexplicable’.[15] 
Less positively, diagnostic criteria can impose a template of characteristics by which 
a person’s ‘difference’ is constructed – a template that exists outside of their control. 
Buying in to the signifier of ‘schizophrenia’ potentially involves a double process of 
misrecognition: not only is the unique and mysterious content of people’s experience 
transmuted into a standardised diagnosis, but this signifier may also attract the 
accretion, within wider social and political discourse, of other undesirable and 
stigmatising attributes, such as the potential to be an axe-murderer.[16,17]  Thus, 
there can be a major price to be paid, in terms of subjection to a signifier that may 
not only influence how people are identified by others, but also, potentially, how they 
come to see themselves – which may, in turn, impact negatively on their symptoms 
and prospects of recovery.[18]  Interestingly, research would indicate that those who 
refuse to accept the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ (and are conventionally seen as 
lacking in ‘insight’) may be better able to resist internalizing the stigmatizing 
connotations that may otherwise link to it.[19]   
 
The prior history of ‘schizophrenia’ 
For medicine to stake its claim to ‘knowing’ about mental distress, a palpable sign 
would be its ability to divide up the field using a language of diagnosis.  Some 
diagnoses, such as ‘depression’ or ‘anxiety’, did little more than re-functionalise 
descriptive signifiers that were already part of a lay vocabulary and, as such, did not 
immediately signal a different order of expert (and specifically medical) 
understanding.  More challenging would be the re-imagining of the broad category of 
madness (or psychosis) into discrete disease entities.  Were this to be achieved, this 
would provide a powerful signification that medicine could claim knowledge of the 
wider field.  
The history of ‘schizophrenia’ as a signifier starts with Kraepelin’s attempt in the 
1880s to distinguish something that was different from the dementia of older age - 
which he termed ‘dementia praecox’ or ‘early dementia’.[20]  Located within and 
deferring to a pre-existing lexicon of medical diagnosis, this sought to signify ‘a 
progressive neurodegenerative disease, which automatically resulted in irreversible 
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loss of cognitive functions’ [21] – one that could be differentiated from ‘manic 
depression’ and which could, in turn, be sub-divided into different forms of 
presentation (such as ‘catatonic’ or ‘paranoid’). 
In the early twentieth century, Bleuler proposed an alternative nomenclature which 
sought to capture what he saw as the essence of the experience – a fragmentation 
of mind.[22]  His new signifier, ‘schizophrenia’, claimed to denote an underlying 
psychic phenomenon: a ‘loosening of associations’ that resulted from a ‘core 
organically based psychological deficit’.[23]  This single underlying disorder could 
become manifest in a range of presentations: the ‘group of schizophrenias’.  
Although the signified was only called into existence by its signifier (and could not 
claim any specific biological referents), the idea of ‘schizophrenia’ nevertheless 
connoted a unity between the underlying psychological and the underlying biological 
that could anchor the emerging specialism of psychiatry. Perhaps more than any 
other psychiatric diagnostic signifier, it simultaneously conjured up a sense of 
mystery and made the claim that biological medicine could solve the mystery.  
It was precisely because the signified was so inherently obscure (unlike with more 
overtly descriptive signifiers such as ‘mania’ or ‘depression’) that it was able to take 
on a particular power within professional and (subsequently) public discourses.  As 
Woods argues, ‘schizophrenia’ became psychiatry’s ‘sublime object’ through its 
construction ‘in psychiatric writing as opaque, bizarre and resistant to analysis’, so 
that it required ever more ‘sophisticated forms of scientific enquiry’ in order to unlock 
its secrets.[24] This set the terms for a project throughout the twentieth century to fix 
this signifier in terms of biology and to give it greater diagnostic specificity – as with 
Schneider’s attempt to define it on the basis of specific ‘first rank’ symptoms.[25]   
However, another contemporary of Kraepelin, Carl Wernicke, saw the way forward 
somewhat differently – a perspective that would resurface with renewed force in the 
twenty-first century:   
‘Wernicke was critical of Kraepelin’s concept of psychiatric disorder as natural 
disease units.  He did not believe that separate routes of investigation (i.e. 
clinical observation, neuroscience, epidemiology) would converge toward 
valid disease entities.  He asked for a radical paradigm shift: replace 
psychiatric nosology with a clinical neuroscience that is anchored in our 
understanding of human brain structure and function’.[26] 
The 1960s saw the emergence of the anti-psychiatry movement with its attempt to 
redefine mental ‘illness’ as existential crisis (Laing) or ‘problem in living’ (Szasz).[27]  
Szasz argued that, not only was ‘schizophrenia’ a myth, but that it held a particular 
quasi-religious status within the practice of psychiatry.[28] However, this critique had 
relatively little influence at the time on the psychiatric mainstream.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, its main impact may have been as a spur to the radical revision of the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders in the late 1970s.  Prior to this, the Association had been remarkably 
pragmatic in its approach, with the preface to DSM-II acknowledging that ‘the 
Committee could not establish agreement about what [‘schizophrenia’] is; it could 
only agree on what to call it’ [29].   
 
The emergence of the modern conception of ‘schizophrenia’ 
With the launch of the third edition (DSM-III) in 1980, this uncertainty of signification 
was addressed, with a commitment to anchor ‘schizophrenia’ in terms of 
symptomatology (if not yet aetiology). This marked a paradigm shift in American 
psychiatry :  
‘In a very short period of time, mental illnesses were transformed from broad, 
etiologically defined entities that were continuous with normality to symptom-
based, categorical diseases’.[30]   
It is argued that this attempt to fix diagnostic definitions was not ‘a product of growing 
scientific knowledge’, but emerged instead from wider discursive and economic 
contexts, including:  
(1) professional politics within the mental health community,  
(2) increased government involvement in mental health research and 
policymaking,  
(3) mounting pressure on American psychiatrists from health insurers to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of their practices, and  
(4) the necessity of pharmaceutical companies to market their products to 
treat specific diseases.[30] 
Signifiers that had been relatively ill-defined and free-floating descriptors of mental 
experience were to be formalised with explicit diagnostic criteria so that they could 
be clearly differentiated from one another – thereby gaining legitimation through their 
deferral to (and conformity with) the accepted medical canon of differential diagnosis.  
The conceit of DSM-III was its substitution of reliability (more consistent identification 
of differences between clusters of symptoms) for validity (representing something 
real and distinct in terms of underlying pathology or process).  As Thomas Insel, the 
former Director of the American National Institute for Mental Health, has argued: 
While DSM has been described as a “Bible” for the field, it is, at best, a 
dictionary, creating a set of labels and defining each. The strength of each of 
the editions of DSM has been “reliability” – each edition has ensured that 
clinicians use the same terms in the same ways. The weakness is its lack of 
validity’.[31]   
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The claim to validity for ‘schizophrenia’ still primarily rested on its deferral to the 
earlier conceptions of Kraepelin and Bleuler, obtaining much of its gravitas from its 
association with the self-sustaining idea of a core dysfunction in psychological 
process that would be of organic origin.   Indeed the architects of DSM-III explicitly 
sought, as far as possible, not to introduce ‘new terminology and concepts that break 
with tradition’ [32] - thereby reinforcing the ‘continuity hypothesis’ in which 
successive redefinitions of ‘schizophrenia’ were seen as simply polishing away any 
‘blemishes and impurities’ associated with a signifier ‘of a real, recognizable, unitary 
and stable object of inquiry’ [5]. It was this firming up at the level of signification, 
rather than any breakthrough in research, that laid the foundation for President 
George Bush’s designation of the 1990s as the ‘decade of the brain’ [33] – a decade 
in which it was believed that medical research would finally be able to map 
psychological dysfunction onto a biological substrate of identifiable disease 
processes. 
The British context was somewhat different.  British psychiatry had adhered to a 
more pragmatic definition of ‘schizophrenia’ found in the World Health Organization 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) version 9.  This signification did not 
pretend the same degree of operational rigour as came with DSM–III, and it was not 
deployed within mental health services in a way which precluded a broader and 
more nuanced understanding of mental distress.  A nationalised health service 
meant that there could not so easily emerge a lucrative confluence of interest 
between pharmaceutical companies, health insurance and biologically oriented 
psychiatrists to construct disease categories for which particular drugs could be seen 
as the treatment of choice.  Initially DSM-III was treated with some scepticism, but 
with increasing international collaboration in research, and the globalisation of the 
pharmaceutical industry, it became more influential and subsequent revisions of the 
ICD have mirrored subsequent iterations of DSM.   
By the mid-1990s, spurred on by apparent breakthroughs in research, the term 
‘schizophrenia’ had assumed an almost iconic status on both sides of the Atlantic as 
the medical diagnosis that was going to demonstrate that biomedical psychiatry was, 
at last, going to be able to define an aetiology, treatment regimen and potential cure 
for the most impenetrable and mysterious of mental disorders.  Anchoring the 
signifier ‘schizophrenia’ in this way would have sealed the successful colonisation of 
mental distress by a biomedical approach – and, in turn, lent status to other 
diagnostic categories that clustered around it and could then defer to it for their 
legitimation.  This would have rendered irrelevant the potentially more complex 
search for meaning and understanding of mental distress from a range of personal, 
psychological and social perspectives.   
Although no definitive correspondence had been discovered between the diagnostic 
construct and a reliable cluster of biochemical characteristics, the anchoring of the 
signifier was secured by a promise: research would soon reveal the genetic and/or 
physiological specificity of ‘schizophrenia’.  There was an interesting collusion 
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between a range of vested interests, social, economic, professional and political, to 
proceed as if there was a certainty about mental illness: that it would no longer be a 
troubling threat to the good order of society, but a straightforward disease of the 
brain that could be controlled by pharmacological treatments.  Particular rhetorical 
devices were deployed, such as ‘reification, the use of an empiricist repertoire and 
the continual evocation of a narrative of scientific progress’.[34] 
The most obvious beneficiaries of this biological construction of ‘schizophrenia’ were 
the pharmaceutical companies who had been unscrupulous in rebranding the 
generic major tranquillisers of the 1960s as if they were ‘magic bullets’ which 
targeted a specific disease process – and then developed a financially more lucrative 
range of supposedly even more efficacious ‘atypical’ medications.[35]  Psychiatry 
stood to gain in terms of power and prestige (and greater perceived equality of status 
with other medical specialties) – although not all psychiatrists were comfortable with 
this biomedical turn within their profession.   While health insurance was not a 
significant player in the UK,  government (and, in particular, the New Labour 
government of 1997) found it helpful to go along with the simple message that 
‘schizophrenia’ – constructed as dangerous within the media and wider social 
discourses – could be contained by a combination of accurate diagnosis, medical 
treatment and, where necessary, compulsory treatment.   
The message that ‘schizophrenia’ was simply a disease, whose ill-effects would 
soon be eradicated by advances in medical research, also had an appeal to many 
family members who might otherwise have felt frightened or overwhelmed.  It is 
perhaps no co-incidence that the signifier ‘schizophrenia’ was embraced in the title of 
the key voluntary organization that had provided support and information to family 
members: the National Schizophrenia Fellowship.  
However, those who received the diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ have tended to be 
less enthusiastic about it for a number of reasons.  As a diagnosis without a medical 
cure attached to it, ‘schizophrenia’ could feel like a life sentence: a paralysing sign 
that rendered them passive in terms of their own recovery, with medical experts only 
offering a prospect of long-term dependence on medication, and little possibility of 
achieving aspirations such as getting a job or starting a family.  Equally debilitating 
could be the impact of the signifier on personal identities and social relationships.  
Anti-stigma campaigns predicated on the message that ‘schizophrenia’ was an 
illness like any other (such as diabetes) have not led to greater public acceptance.  
Instead, the evidence would suggest that such campaigns can actually back-fire, 
with the apparent biological anchoring of the diagnostic signifier tending to construct 
people as irrevocably ‘other’ and therefore even more likely to be shunned or 
excluded.[36]   
Such an anchoring of this signifier at the heart of service discourses (and wider 
social and political discourses) had a major impact at the more intimate level.  It 
sealed a particular way in which people were invited to see themselves, and it set 
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the terms of social interactions between professionals and service users and, 
somewhat more insidiously, of those between service users and their family and 
friends.  A generation of psychiatrists and, to a significant extent, nurses, 
psychologists and social workers, were trained to ignore much of what people were 
telling them about the content and meaning of their experiences; all that mattered 
was correctly locating people’s presentations within a signifying chain of differential 
diagnosis.   
 
Doubts and controversies 
Over the following decade, the ‘schizophrenia gene’ eluded discovery, the dopamine 
hypothesis turned out to be too simplistic a physiological explanation, and the new 
wave of anti-psychotic medication turned out to be hardly more effective in managing 
problematic experiences than the major tranquillisers of the 1960s.[37]  Alongside 
this, the emerging Recovery movement increasingly looked beyond medicine for 
what might enable people to reclaim satisfying and meaningful lives.[38]  The status 
of the signifier ‘schizophrenia’ started to look a little more fragile.   
At a policy level in the UK (as in the promotion of Early Intervention services), 
mainstream psychiatry increasingly used the broader term ‘psychosis’ to denote 
experiences of madness.  This did not purport to be a formal medical diagnosis and 
did note evoke the same connotations as ‘schizophrenia’ within clinical or wider 
social discourses.  In response to this growing discomfort, the National 
Schizophrenia Fellowship had rebranded itself as Rethink and, although the signifier 
returned to prominence with their ‘Schizophrenia Commission’ in 2011, the latter’s 
report offers it a much less certain linguistic status, recommending that ‘the more 
general term’, psychosis, can be preferable.[39]  
Another threat to the dominance of the signifier ‘schizophrenia’ came through the 
rival discourse of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  This had originally emerged as a 
diagnosis to describe the mental distress experienced by veterans of the Vietnam 
War, but which was becoming used with increasing frequency, particularly in the 
USA,[40] with experiences such as childhood abuse and domestic violence being 
increasingly being cited as causative factors.  Here some very similar symptoms 
(such as hearing voices) were understood as the reactions of ordinary people to 
extraordinary and overwhelming situations.[41]  To muddy the waters further, 
research findings indicated that a substantial proportion of people with a diagnosis of 
‘schizophrenia’ reported that they were also survivors of trauma.[42,43]  This 
foregrounding of social over biological causation offered a new way of linking to 
neuroscience that bypassed the role of signifiers such as ‘schizophrenia’.   For 
example, the traumatogenic neurodevelopmental model explored the imprint of 
trauma on brain functioning without the need for any intermediary concept of 
‘illness’.[44] 
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This insidious resurgence of explanatory pluralism was met with a call to arms by 
Craddock and colleagues in the British Journal of Psychiatry in 2008.  In their ‘Wake-
up call’ to the profession, they argued that British psychiatry was facing an ‘identity 
crisis’ – implicitly situating their professional identity as depending on the survival of 
signifiers such as ‘schizophrenia’, which marked out their territory as properly 
medical.  They were specifically concerned that the ‘creeping devaluation of 
medicine … is very damaging to both the standing and the understanding of 
psychiatry in the minds of the public, fellow professionals and the medical students 
who will be responsible for the specialty’s future’.[45] Using similarly emotive 
language, Tyrer argues that, despite its imperfections, ‘psychiatry without diagnosis 
will return us to the Dark Ages’.[8]   
From within the psychiatric establishment, Lieberman and First still felt able to reject 
calls for the renaming of ‘schizophrenia’, asserting that ‘schizophrenia is not caused 
by disturbed psychological development or bad parenting’, but was instead 
associated with ‘abnormalities in brain structure and function’.[46]  However, this flew 
in the face of a mounting body of evidence that adversities in childhood most 
certainly did increase the likelihood of such experiences [47,48] and an 
acknowledgement by some of those involved in the preparation of DSM-5 that ‘not 
one laboratory marker has been found to be specific in identifying any of the DSM-
defined syndromes’.[49] 
Perhaps the most telling critique of conventional constructions of ‘schizophrenia’ 
came from a grass-roots self-help movement, the Hearing Voices Network.  Here, 
people came together and shared their experiences of voice-hearing, challenging its 
status as a ‘symptom’ of a mental illness and asserting their right to make their own 
sense of who and what their voices might represent – with many choosing to 
understand their experiences as responses to life circumstances or events.[50]  
Such a search for meaning outside the strait-jacket of medical diagnosis is also a 
key feature of the Open Dialogue approach, which is now starting to become more 
influential in mental health services.[51,52] 
In parallel with these developments, some senior figures within psychology and 
psychiatry had started to question the credibility of ‘schizophrenia’ as a diagnostic 
entity that actually stood up on its own terms.  In the USA, as part of a long 
sequence of preparatory work leading to the most recent revision of DSM (DSM-5), 
the Nomenclature Work Group openly queried whether ‘schizophrenia’ could stand 
up as a categorical diagnosis (either you have ‘schizophrenia’ or you do not). They 
recommended that consideration be given to a more nuanced dimensional approach 
in which traits associated with ‘schizophrenia’ could be seen as being on a 
continuum, part of which would fall within the bounds of normal variation within the 
general population.[53]  Similarly, in the UK, psychologists such as Boyle and Bentall 
had been arguing that ‘schizophrenia’ had no validity if judged against what had 
been seen as the accepted criteria for medical diagnosis [9,11] – and that, instead, it 
was more helpful to structure therapeutic conversations with service users around 
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what they saw as their specific complaints: perhaps the impact of a malevolent 
internal voice or an irrational belief.   
Instead of research supporting the idea of schizophrenia as denoting a distinct 
disease, the psychiatrist, van Os, argued that 
‘Psychotic disorders appear to be fuzzy in that they blur into normality.  The 
evidence suggests a natural representation of psychotic disorders that is 
dimensional along a continuum from subclinical expression to psychotic 
disorder...  Therefore, understanding a diagnosis of psychotic disorder 
becomes understanding the onset of need for care’.[54]  
Even in the heartlands of schizophrenia research, there was increasing 
acknowledgement that the Kraepelinian project to divide up madness into discrete 
entities was no longer viable.  In his editorial for the Schizophrenia Bulletin in 2014, 
Carpenter suggested that the Journal would have to learn to live with the idea of 
‘porous diagnostic boundaries’ as ‘the anticipated reconceptualization of mental 
disorders based on fundamental and differentiated etiopathophysiological 
knowledge’ had not (yet) been achieved.  Most tellingly, he then proposed a way 
forward that was situated much more in the world of semiotics than science.  He 
argued that: 
‘These issues provide an important opportunity and challenge for this 
journal. Schizophrenia Bulletin is an old and honored name. We intend to 
broaden the mission without damaging the brand’.[55] 
By implication, it is not just the Schizophrenia Bulletin, but also ‘schizophrenia’ itself 
that had become a ‘brand’ that owed its significance, not so much to its ability to 
delineate anything very meaningful in the real, but to its history, its ability to defer 
back, as an ‘old and honoured name’, to a chain of signification that started with 
Kraepelin’s Dementia Praecox.  However, what was actually to be signified by a 
more porous ‘schizophrenia’ had remarkably little in common with the original 
Kraepelinian project.  It no longer claimed to denote a disease that was 
characterised by progressive neurodegeneration or which categorically differed from 
mania or psychotic depression.  Furthermore, the most recent revision of DSM 
(DSM-5) saw the abandonment of any attempt to delineate sub-types of 
‘schizophrenia’ or to privilege Schneider’s ‘first rank symptoms’ within diagnosis. 
Thus, despite the attempt to maintain a discourse of continuity and ongoing 
refinement, it was becoming less and less clear what of substance remained that 
was actually to be signified by ‘schizophrenia’, beyond a pick-and-mix collection of 
potentially heterogeneous symptoms.  While ‘schizophrenia’ may represent an ‘old 
and honoured name’ for some elements within psychiatry, such cherished reverence 
for the term may be less likely to be found among many users of mental health 
services. 
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Emergence of alternative modes of signification 
If it were stripped of its power as a signifier of altered biology, ‘schizophrenia’ could 
lose its place in wider medical chains of signification – and hence many of its current 
meanings and its ability to dominate the discursive frames in which mental health 
practitioners operate.  Having increasingly fragile claims to ontological validity, its 
only potential currency would be as a convenient ‘shorthand’ that encapsulated 
particular sets of experiences that was helpful for service users, family members and 
professionals in talking about needs for therapy and care:   
‘Thoughtful clinicians have long been aware that diagnostic categories are … 
justified only by whether they provide a useful framework for organizing and 
explaining the complexity of clinical experience in order to derive inferences 
about outcomes and to guide decisions about treatment’.[56]  
However, any such benefit associated with the term ‘schizophrenia’ may be 
outweighed, for many service users, by its potentially damaging and stigmatising 
social connotations.  One approach has been to seek alternative signifiers to denote 
the same ‘bundle’ of experiences – for example, ‘integration disorder’[57] or 
‘psychosis susceptibility syndrome’.[58]  An alternative approach that has found 
some favour with service users has been to break up any over-arching concept of 
‘schizophrenia’ and instead to develop signifiers to denote specific routes of 
causation, such as ‘traumatic psychosis’, or areas of challenge in current functioning, 
such as ‘stress-sensitivity psychosis’.[59]   Research would suggest that less 
mystifying signifiers such as these are less likely to provoke a response of social 
distancing.[60] 
There were suggestions from the Work Group revising diagnostic classifications for 
ICD-11 that they would ‘give careful attention to the viability of the term 
schizophrenia’, and that they were ‘conscious that an exceptional opportunity exists 
for WHO to remove the word from the public and professional vocabulary’.[61]  
However, more recent indications suggest that only the definitions of sub-types will 
change – with ICD again following the lead of DSM.[62]  A more radical response 
was an international social movement called the Campaign for the Abolition of the 
Schizophrenia Label which argued that ‘the concept of schizophrenia …has outlived 
any usefulness it may once have claimed’ and that ‘the label schizophrenia is 
extremely damaging to those to whom it is applied’.[63]   
Although these potential destabilisations of ‘schizophrenia’ as a signifier have yet to 
unseat its dominant status, a more pluralistic space is emerging in which different 
ways of representing experience are becoming possible - including within the 
professional discourses of psychology, nursing, social work and, to a significant 
extent, psychiatry itself.[64,65,66]  A recent Maudsley debate addressed the 
question ‘Has psychiatric diagnosis labeled rather than enabled patients?’[67]  The 
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Division of Clinical Psychology of the British Psychological Society issued a position 
statement that there was ‘a need for a paradigm shift’ away from the use of 
diagnoses such as schizophrenia ‘towards a conceptual model not based on a 
“disease” model’[68] – and this was given prominence to a lay audience via a 
headline in the Observer newspaper: ‘Medicine’s big new battleground: does mental 
illness really exist?’[69]  Within this emerging discursive space, there is now more 
possibility for therapeutic conversations between practitioners and service users to 
embrace different frameworks for meaning, with those with lived experience having a 
small but increasing say in how they may wish their experience to be signified.[70]   
However, in the longer term, perhaps the greatest threat to the continued dominance 
of the signifier ‘schizophrenia’ may come, not from service user concerns or critiques 
emerging from within the mental health professions, but from its apparently polar 
opposite: the scientific and political advance of neuroscience.   As Wernicke had 
argued a century earlier, instead of trying to infer the existence of a disorder of 
mind/brain on the basis of regularities in presentation of symptoms (where biological 
correlates have remained elusive), might it not make more sense to start the other 
way around with a study of the bio-electrical processes of the brain – and the 
isolation of potential variabilities within these?  Such an approach is gaining traction 
within clinical psychology and has spawned the suggestion within medicine that 
psychiatry and neurology should consider a ‘merger’.[71]  For good or ill, such an 
approach has also gained political support on both sides of the Atlantic, with former 
President Barack Obama heralding (with remarkably little historical insight) a new 
‘decade of the brain’ and the New York Times front-page headline proclaiming that 
neuroscience will enable us to see ‘how the brain creates the mind’.[72]    
Underpinning this neurological ‘turn’ would be the abandoning of DSM and its 
replacement by a new classification framework for brain disorders (termed Research 
Domain Criteria) which would be grounded in neurobiological observation of brain-
circuitry rather than clusterings of functional symptoms.[73]  While it is likely that 
advances in brain science may indeed throw light on specific cognitive, emotional or 
behavioural process, it seems somewhat improbable that it would come up with such 
a sprawling and inconsistent conception as that of ‘schizophrenia’.   
In the shorter term, it is likely that current configurations of professional, economic 
and political interests may secure the continuance of ‘schizophrenia’ in its present 
form in the next iterations of DSM and ICD classifications.  However, beneath this, 
tectonic plates may be shifting and, were an effective alliance to be made between 
neuroscience and those professionals and service users who question its utility or 
validity, ‘schizophrenia’ as a signifier might become unseated for good.  Its likely 
replacement would be a new regime of signification in which problematic social 
experiences, such as trauma [44], attachment issues [74] or ‘social defeat’ [75], 
could be linked to neuro-biological correlates, leading to ways of conceptualising 
neurodiversity  that bypass the idea of illness altogether.[76, 77]  Such a new regime 
could claim legitimacy on the basis of denotive signs with a more transparent 
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connection to the real (both social and neurobiological), rather than having to make a 
more tenuous claim by deferring to the ‘old and honoured name’ of ‘schizophrenia’.   
However, as this paper has shown, the politics of signification in this field are not 
necessarily benign, with vested interests gaining power and influence through 
securing particular strategies for dividing up the complex realm of distress 
experiences and privileging certain systems of mutually reinforcing signifiers.  A new 
regime of signification may not necessarily be any more emancipatory for those with 
mental health difficulties than that which it would replace.  If it secures legitimation on 
the basis of deferral to the signifiers of ‘hard science’, rather than (also) connecting 
to the social and personal experiences of people with mental distress, it may simply 
provide cover for pharmaceutical companies and technologically-oriented 
professionals to take charge of the field with new claims of expert authority.  As Rose 
observes, ‘all pathways through the brain seem to end in the use of 
psychopharmaceuticals'.[78]  
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